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Comment on Provisional Patent Rights 
By Sharick Naqi * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Inventors in America long lived with the risk that others could copy and profit off 
an invention during the interim period when their patent application was pending at the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  Even after inventors received their 
patent, they were unable to get compensation for any infringing uses that occurred prior 
to the patent issue date.  With an ever-expanding backlog at the USPTO and the 
corresponding increase in the time it takes for an application to be examined, this 
unprotected period potentially cost inventors significant losses.  Additionally, contrary to 
the purpose of patent laws “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”1 
inventors were incentivized to keep an invention secret from the public until their patent 
issued. 
¶2  In the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), Congress gave patent 
applicants provisional rights in their published patent applications under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(d).
2
  Prior to the passage of the AIPA in 1999, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, affirming its earlier decisions, had held that a patentee “may of course obtain 
damages only for acts of infringement after the issuance of the . . . patent.”3  However, 
the AIPA provided damages for infringement in the period before a patent applicant is 
granted a patent.
4
  Provisional rights, also known as pre-issuance royalties, provide a 
patentee with the prospect of obtaining a reasonable royalty from a third party that 
infringes a published application claim.  This right is provided only if the third party has 




¶3  The Federal Circuit has not had the opportunity to interpret the “substantially 
identical” and “actual notice” requirements under § 154(d), but several district courts 
have done so.
6
  At first glance, the district court rulings appear to be conflicting.  
However, this Comment explains how the rulings are actually consistent, with each one 
adding a slightly different layer to the interpretation of § 154(d).  Currently, the various 
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 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2006). 
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 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)–(2). 
6
 However, the language found in § 154(d) runs parallel to that found in § 252, which allows a reissued 
patent to have retrospective power when the reissued claims are “substantially identical” to those in the 
original patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 252.  There are several Federal Circuit cases, decided before Congress 
passed § 154(d), that provide some guidance for interpreting “substantially identical.” 
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rulings addressing the actual notice requirement have not only ruled out constructive 
notice but also indicate that direct notification action by the patentee is not a necessary 
condition.  It is sufficient if the alleged infringer knew about the patent application 
through other channels.  Other rulings indicate that when patentees do take direct actions 
to notify, they cannot conceal the notification among other documents, although they do 
not have to point out the infringement of specific claims. 
¶4  The cases addressing the substantially identical requirement emphasize that each 
claim amendment should be evaluated carefully to see if it changes the scope of the claim 
and that not all claim amendments preclude a finding that claims are substantially 
identical, even those that are in response to USPTO rejections.  These cases suggest that 
narrowing amendments can preclude a finding that claims are substantially identical, and 
such an interpretation, when considered in combination with an earlier Federal Circuit 
decision that arguably expands the definition of narrowing amendments, could severely 
limit the application of § 154(d).  This Comment first explores the different rulings, 
reconciles them, and suggests that the Federal Circuit should consolidate the rulings from 
the district courts into one binding decision that will provide greater certainty to litigants.  
This Comment also explores the potential implications of the suggested decision. 
¶5  Although the few district courts that have addressed these issues so far have 
produced reasonable results, their rulings are not binding.  This Comment recommends 
that the Federal Circuit, when given the chance to review a case where § 154(d) 
provisional rights are disputed, provide a decision consolidating the reasonable 
interpretations applied by the various district court rulings up to this point.  Otherwise, 
there is a risk that other district courts may produce undesirable interpretations.  Forum 
shopping is very common in patent cases and infringers might find courts that take the 
interpretation in a direction that weakens the protection promised to inventors.  Such 
uncertainty about the application of § 154(d) could conflict with Congress’s intent to 
provide protection for inventors and could increase overall litigation costs. 
II. PROVISIONAL RIGHTS 
¶6  The AIPA requires that the USPTO publish utility patent applications eighteen 
months after the earliest effective filing date or priority date claimed by an application.  
Once it is published, the patent application can be viewed in its entirety by anyone who 
requests to do so.
7
  However, subject to minimal limitations, an applicant may request 
that the application not be published.
8
  Patent applicants are also allowed to rescind 
nonpublication requests at any time.
9
 
¶7  Before Congress passed the AIPA, damages for patent infringement were generally 
available only for the time period after a patent’s issuance.  However, Congress gave 
patent applicants provisional rights in their published patent applications as an incentive 
to publish, so that information about new advances could be shared with the public 
regardless of whether a patent issues from an application.
10
  Congress also intended this 
 
7
 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS 11 (2011), 




 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
10
 See Patrick J. Birde & Nicholas J. Nowak, 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) Grants Patent Applicants Provisional 
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to serve as a check on those who may abuse the pre-grant publication system by copying 
inventions before a patent’s issuance.11  After publication, an applicant may assert 
provisional rights under § 154(d).
12
 
¶8  Generally, damages are only available after the USPTO issues a patent to an 
applicant.  Provisional rights are an exception to this general rule under § 154(d).  These 
rights allow a patentee to obtain a reasonable royalty from one who infringed upon the 
invention as claimed in the published patent application, between the date on which the 
application was published and the date of the patent’s issuance.13 
III. DEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROVISIONAL RIGHTS 
¶9  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not explicitly addressed the issue 
of provisional rights, a patentee’s right to pre-issuance royalties.  This right is established 
when an infringer has actual notice of the patent application publication and the claims in 
the issued patent and the published patent publication are substantially identical.  The 
Federal Circuit has not provided clarification with respect to either the actual notice or 
substantially identical requirements under § 154(d).
14
  However, the district courts in K-
TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp.,
15
 First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc.,
16
 and Arendi Holding 
Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,
17
 addressed provisional rights stemming from published patent 
applications and gave some clarification on the actual notice requirement.  These cases 
indicate that constructive notice is not sufficient, but that direct notification by a patentee 
is sufficient (though not necessary) if the alleged infringer knew about the patent 
application through other means.  Other rulings indicate that when patentees take direct 
action, they do not have to specifically point out the infringement.  However, they cannot 
conceal the notification among other documents. 
¶10  K-TEC and Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC also provide some guidance 
for the substantially identical requirement.
18
  This guidance has interesting implications 
when read in combination with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Honeywell International 
Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.
19
  The district court cases emphasize that the impact 
of each claim amendment on the scope of the claim should be carefully evaluated and 
that not all claim amendments preclude a finding that claims are substantially identical—
 
Rights in Their Published Patent Applications, KENYON & KENYON INTELL. PROP. L., 
http://www.kenyon.com/media/~/media/Files/Publication%20PDFs/2003-09-01_Rights.ashx (last visited 




 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 7. 
13
 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)–(2) (“[A] patent shall include the right to obtain a reasonable royalty from 
any person who . . . makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States the invention as claimed in the 
published patent application or imports such an invention into the United States; . . . and (B) had actual 
notice of the published patent application. . . .  The right . . . to obtain a reasonable royalty shall not be 
available under this subsection unless the invention as claimed in the patent is substantially identical to the 
invention as claimed in the published patent application.”). 
14
 See supra note 6. 
15
 No. 2:06-CV-108-TC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *1 (D. Utah May 24, 2010). 
16
 No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70482, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 17, 2008). 
17
 No. 09-119-JJF-LPS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 22, 2010). 
18
 See K-TEC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *1; Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-
06-600, 2008 WL 3307156, at *9 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2008). 
19
 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
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even those that are in response to USPTO rejections.  The district courts further suggest 
that narrowing amendments can preclude a finding of substantially identical claims.  This 
reasoning, when considered in light of the Federal Circuit’s Honeywell decision possibly 
expanding the definition of narrowing amendments, could severely limit the application 
of § 154(d). 
¶11  In K-TEC, while considering a motion for summary judgment, the District Court of 
Utah ruled that recovering pre-issuance reasonable royalties under § 154(d) requires the 
plaintiff to show that (1) the alleged infringer had actual notice of the patent application 
and (2) that the claims of the patent application are substantially identical.
20
  In Arendi, 
the Federal District Court for the District of Delaware laid out requirements similar to 
those presented in K-TEC.
21
  Therefore, the patentee’s right to pre-issuance royalties is 
established when an infringer has actual notice of the patent application publication and 
the claims in the issued patent and the published patent publication are substantially 
identical. 
A. Defining the “Actual Notice” Requirement 
¶12  In Arendi, the alleged notice was included among thousands of documents 
produced in another litigation action between the same parties.
22
  In First Years, the 
plaintiff had evidence that its counsel sent a letter to the defendant specifically 
identifying the applications at issue.
23
  In K-TEC, the patentee had taken no steps to 
inform the alleged infringer of the patent application, but the alleged infringer was 
monitoring the application on its own. 
1. Arendi’s Interpretation of “Actual Notice” 
¶13  The plaintiff in Arendi filed a patent infringement suit against Microsoft Corp. and 
Dell Inc. in the District of Delaware for infringement of its patent.
24
  Arendi sought pre-
issuance damages by asserting provisional rights under § 154(d).
25
 
¶14  The parties cited the same House Report, each arguing that the legislative history of 
§ 154(d) supported their position.
26
  The House Report states: 
The requirement of actual notice is critical.  The mere fact that the published 
application is included in a commercial database where it might be found is 
insufficient.  The published applicant must give actual notice of the published 
application to the accused infringer and explain what acts are regarded as giving 





 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *21–22 (citations omitted). 
21
 Arendi Holding Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 09-119-JJF-LPS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020 (D. Del. 
Mar. 22, 2010). 
22
 Id. at *21. 
23
 First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70482, at *3 (W.D. 
Wis. Sept. 17, 2008). 
24




 Id. at *18–19. 
27
 H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, pt. 1, at 55 (1999). 
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In a motion for summary judgment ruling that denied Arendi provisional damages, the 
court held that the plain language of § 154(d) does not require “that the patent applicant 
take an affirmative act to provide such notice to the alleged infringer (if the applicant can 
prove that the alleged infringer came to have actual notice through some other means).”28  
Although this would appear to help Arendi’s case at first glance, the court added: 
It is not enough that the alleged infringer had information from which it could or 
should have become aware of the existence of the published patent application 
. . . “[t]he mere fact that the published application is included in a commercial 
database where it might be found is insufficient.”29 
The Arendi court explicitly dismissed the arguments for a direct notification requirement 
based on legislative history indicating that Congress intended for the patentee to provide 
notice to the alleged infringer.
30
  However, under the facts of this case, providing the 
notice of publication for the application and related documents among thousands of other 
documents was not enough to establish actual notice.
31
 
2. First Years’s Interpretation of “Actual Notice” 
¶15  First Years presented a different scenario from Arendi.  The plaintiff filed suit in 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against Munchkin, Inc. for 
patent infringement and sought pre-issuance damages by asserting provisional rights 
under § 154(d).
32
  Munchkin filed a motion to dismiss.
33
 
¶16  Plaintiffs asserted that they had provided actual notice of the published patent 
application because they had evidence that their counsel sent a letter to Munchkin 
bringing Munchkin’s attention to the published patent application and indicating that 
copies of the patent application were included.  Munchkin contended that there was 
inadequate evidence that it had actual notice.
34
  The defendant argued that if identifying a 
patent later found to be infringing is not sufficient to be entitled to infringement damages 
under § 287(a), then simply identifying a patent application should not be sufficient to be 
entitled to damages under § 154(d).
35
 
¶17  In denying Munchkin’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for pre-issuance 
damages under § 154(d), the court ruled that, in cases of direct notification by the 
patentee, notice of the published patent application by calling attention to it in a letter is 
sufficient under § 154(d).
36
  The court further stated that, unlike § 287(a), “there is no 
requirement that a patentee provide notice of the specific manner by which a defendant is 
believed to be practicing the inventions claimed in a patent application.”37 
 
28
 Arendi, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020, at *23. 
29
 Id. at *28 (second alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, at 55). 
30
 Id. at *5. 
31
 Id. at *32. 
32
 First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70482 (W.D. Wis. 
Sept. 17, 2008). 
33
 Id. at *3. 
34
 Id. at *4. 
35
 Id. at *4–5. 
36
 Id. at *3–5. 
37
 Id. at *5. 
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3. K-TEC’s Interpretation of “Actual Notice” 
¶18  The plaintiff in K-TEC filed suit against Vita-Mix Corp. for patent infringement 
and sought pre-issuance damages by asserting provisional rights under § 154(d).
38
  The 
defendant argued “that K-TEC [wa]s not entitled to provisional rights because . . . the 
claims of the [] published application [we]re not substantially identical to the claims of 
the [issued] patent; and [because] K-TEC ha[d] no evidence of the amount of pre-
issuance royalty damages it claim[ed] to have suffered.”39  In dismissing Vita-Mix’s 
motion for summary judgment, the court, citing Arendi, ruled that “[a]lthough written 
notice [from patentee to alleged infringer] is certainly sufficient to satisfy the statutory 
requirement, the court does not read the statute’s plain language to be so limited.”40  It 
held that a narrow interpretation, requiring the notice to take the form of a direct 
notification from patentee, was unpersuasive.
41
  The court ruled that “[a] reasonable jury 
could find that [the alleged infringer] was actually aware of the [] publication at some 
point before the [] patent was issued” based on evidence in the form of e-mails showing 
that they “monitored the application which matured to the [issued] patent.”42  Thus, 
actual notice can be met if the alleged infringer knew of the published application 
through other means even without any direct involvement of the patentee. 
4. Reconciling Arendi’s, First Years’s, and K-TEC’s Interpretations of “Actual Notice” 
¶19  In First Years, the court ruled that a letter identifying the published application was 
sufficient for actual notice.
43
  However, in Arendi, the court ruled that simply providing 
the notice of publication for the application and related documents among thousands of 
other documents was not enough to establish actual notice.
44
  The Arendi court 
distinguished the case from First Years on the ground that, unlike First Years, the 
documents related to the published patent application in Arendi were sent with thousands 
of other documents and the cover letter made no mention of the patent application.
45
  In 
contrast to Arendi and First Years, K-TEC shows that actual notice can be met even 
without any direct involvement or any direct action by the patentee.
46
 
¶20  Thus, a patentee’s direct notification of an alleged infringer has been considered 
sufficient to establish actual notice when it simply identifies the patent application and 
calls attention to it but does not identify the specific infringing action.  However, simply 
including a notice of publication of an application (and related documents) along with 
thousands of other documents without mentioning it in the cover letter was insufficient.  
The presence of the published application in a commercial database where it may be 
 
38
 K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., No. 2:06-CV-108-TC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *4, *20 (D. 
Utah May 24, 2010). 
39
 Id. at *20–23 (citations omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(B) (2006)). 
40




 Id. at *24. 
43
 First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70482 (W.D. Wis. 
Sept. 17, 2008). 
44
 Arendi Holding Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 09-119-JJF-LPS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020, at *29–




 See K-TEC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858. 
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found is also insufficient.  It is also important to note district courts’ interpretations of the 
differences between actual notice for provisional rights under § 154(d), covering the time 
period between the publication date and the issue date of a patent and the notice 
requirement under § 287(a) for damages covering the time period after a patent issues.  It 
is not enough for a patentee to simply identify a patent later found to be infringing to 
receive damages under § 287(a); the patentee must identify the act of infringement.  
However, under § 154(d), there is no requirement to specifically identify the 
infringement; identifying the published application is enough, as long as it is not hidden 
among thousands of other documents.  Notice can be met if the alleged infringer knew of 
the published application through other means even without any direct involvement of the 
patentee. 
5. Implications of the Actual Notice Requirement for Provisional Rights 
¶21  One obvious question that arises after looking at K-TEC’s interpretation of actual 
notice is whether companies should be tracking a competitor’s patent portfolio.  It has 
been common practice for companies to track their competitors’ patent portfolios to be 
aware of competing products and any potential for patent infringement disputes.  In light 
of K-TEC, one must consider the potential pros and cons of such a decision.  Since an 
action for infringement or provisional rights cannot be brought until the patent issues, this 
gives people time to redesign around and prepare ahead of time for potential issues with 
competitors’ patents.  Therefore, tracking pending patent applications may help in 
avoiding damages later by taking measures before the patent issues.  On the other hand, 
records that come out during discovery could show that the defendant was aware of the 
application.  Evidence of such tracking can then be used to establish actual notice and get 
reasonable royalties for the pre-issue period. 
¶22  The decision whether to track patent applications is further complicated by the fact 
that provisional rights depend on the claims being substantially identical in the 
application and the issued patent.  There is no way to predict with certainty which 
applications will issue as patents with substantially identical claims.  Therefore, a patent 
holder tracking their competitor’s patent applications would be assuming the risk of 
having to pay reasonable royalties for a period before the patent issues, if that application 
issues as a patent with substantially identical claims and their product reads upon those 
claims.  Although this may seem unduly harsh, it fits with Congress’s purpose for 
providing provisional rights.  Congress intended to dissuade people from taking 
advantage of the patent publication system by making the inventions described in the 
patent application publications.  Anyone whose invention comes within the scope of the 
claims in the published application would have the incentive to either cease their 
infringing activity or provide valid prior art to the USPTO so that the application’s claims 
have to be amended. 
¶23  Inventors with patent publications also face a difficult decision when deciding 
whether or not to provide notice of their patent publications to other parties.  The obvious 
advantage is that the patent publication owners would get the chance to collect damages 
for a longer period of time since they can establish actual notice for provisional rights by 
giving such notice.  However, the disadvantage is that, following publication, the 
application for patent is no longer held in confidence by the USPTO and anyone may 
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request access to the entire file history of the application.  A competitor can then submit 
prior art against an issued patent or pending patent application to the USPTO. 
¶24  Such submissions can occur in several ways:  (1) third-party submissions in patent 
applications,
47
 (2) protests against published applications,
48
 and (3) citation of prior art in 
issued patents.
49
  Third-party submissions in patent applications and protests against 
published applications are the main tools a competitor would use against a published 
application to either try to get the issuing claims to be no longer substantially identical, or 
to prevent the patent from issuing altogether, thereby avoiding the reach of § 154(d).  
However, this could backfire because if a competitor is submitting prior art under 37 
C.F.R. § 1.99 or lodging a protest under 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 directed towards a specific 
application, it is also potential evidence of actual notice of the application. 
¶25  From the perspective of the inventor, prior art submissions could have positive or 
negative effects on the patent application.  Although the inventor wants the best patent 
possible after all prior art is considered, prior art submitted by its competitors may result 
in amended or narrower claims such that the inventor can no longer get pre-issuance 
damages because the claims of the issued patent are no longer substantially identical to 
those in the patent publication.  Competitors could strategically turn in prior art to delay 
the patent application.  The prior art submissions may even result in complete denial of a 
patent.  Therefore, inventors must be very careful in deciding when to inform competitors 
and potential infringers about patent publications.  Since third-party submissions in patent 
applications have to be made within two months of the publication date of a patent 
application,
50
 it would be advisable for inventors to hold off on providing competitors 
with information about the published patent application to minimize the chances that they 
could interfere with the prosecution of that patent application. 
B. Defining “Substantially Identical” 
¶26  Under § 154(d), even after an infringer has actual notice of the patent application 
publication, a patentee’s right to pre-issuance royalties is not established unless the 
claims in the issued patent and the published patent publication are substantially 
identical.  Pandora and K-TEC clarify how claim amendments factor into the 
determination of whether patented claims are substantially identical to the ones presented 
in the published application. 
 
47
 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2011).  These submissions are “[s]ubmissions by the public of patents or 
publications [made] only [d]uring the pendency of a published application.” Vincent LoTempio, “Patent 
Pending” Provisional Rights, LOTEMPIO L. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2010), 
http://www.lotempiolaw.com/2010/08/articles/patents/patent-pending-provisional-rights/.  They “must be 
filed within two months from the date of publication of the application (§ 1.215(a)) or prior to the mailing 
of a notice of allowance (§ 1.311), whichever is earlier.” Id. 
48
 37 C.F.R. § 1.291.  These protests may be filed by “[a]ny member of the public, including private 
persons, corporate entities, and government agencies [i]n a pending patent application [and] [w]ill be 
matched with [an] application file if [the protest] adequately identifies the patent application.” LoTempio, 
supra note 47.  In addition, “[a] protest has to be filed before publication or before a notice of allowance.” 
Id. 
49
 37 C.F.R. § 1.501.  In other words, “[a]ny person, individual, corporate or government entity, real 
parties in interest, [or] persons without a real interest [m]ay submit patents or publications along with an 
explanation [h]aving a bearing on the patentability of any claim in a particular patent.” LoTempio, supra 
note 47. 
50
 37 C.F.R. § 1.99. 
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1. Pandora’s Interpretation of “Substantially Identical” 
¶27  In Pandora, the plaintiff filed a suit for patent infringement against Chamilia, LLC 
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, claiming that Chamilia’s 
jewelry literally infringed the provisional rights of its patent.
51
  The court held that the 
claims were not substantially identical on the ground that Pandora made a narrowing 
amendment by substantively amending the scope of a claim to overcome the USPTO’s 
rejection of its patent application.  As a result, the court held that “[b]ecause the issued 
patent was not substantially identical to the published patent application, Pandora ha[d] 
no provisional rights to assert.”52  Therefore, according to the Pandora ruling, a court 
must determine whether the scope is the same and not just whether the words are 
different.  However, there are not many situations where changes made to rejected claims 
to make them allowable would not be substantive changes. 
2. K-TEC’s Interpretation of “Substantially Identical” 
¶28  The plaintiff in K-TEC filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah 
against Vita-Mix Corp. for patent infringement and sought pre-issuance damages by 
asserting provisional rights under § 154(d).
53
  K-TEC was required to show that the 
claims of Vita-Mix’s patent application were substantially identical to those in K-TEC’s 
patent.  In dismissing Vita-Mix’s motion for summary judgment, the court found the 
patent prosecution history could support the conclusion that the two sets of claims were 
substantially similar.
54
  Although there was an amendment made to the patent to secure 
the patent from the USPTO, which “can preclude a finding that the claims are not [sic] 
‘substantially similar,’ ‘there is no per se rule that an amendment to a claim in order to 
overcome a [US]PTO rejection based on prior art precludes finding provisional rights.’”55 
3. Reconciling K-TEC’s and Pandora’s Interpretations of “Substantially Identical” 
¶29  Although the holdings are different, the takeaways from Pandora and K-TEC are 
the same:  Not all amendments to the claims result in a finding that the claims of the 
published application and issued patent are not substantially identical.  Even if the claim 
amendments are in response to a rejection from the USPTO, they can still leave the 
claims substantially identical unless the amendment narrows the scope of the claim.  
Although there are few situations where changes made to rejected claims to make them 
allowable would not be substantive changes, if the substance of the claims stays the same 
(i.e., in situations where the claim amendments make the claims more definite or better 
describe the same feature without narrowing it), they are still substantially identical.  
Provisional rights are still available as long as the actual notice requirement is also met.  
Therefore, in light of these two rulings, amendments that simply clarify the scope of the 
 
51
 Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-600, 2008 WL 3307156, at *9 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 
2008). 
52
 Id. at *10. 
53
 K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., No. 2:06-CV-108-TC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *20–21 (D. 
Utah May 24, 2010). 
54
 Id. at *24. 
55
 Id. 
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claim language do not alter the claims substantially, and each claim amendment must be 
evaluated carefully to gauge its impact on the scope of the claim. 
IV. NARROWING AMENDMENTS AND HONEYWELL 
¶30  Narrowing amendments can preclude a finding that the claims are substantially 
identical, whereas amendments that make the claims more definite leave the claims 
substantially identical.  Thus, it is important to understand what kind of amendments 
would be considered narrowing amendments.  Typically, narrowing amendments would 
require that the claim language be changed such that the new language encompasses less 
(i.e., a smaller scope) than that of the previous claim.  However, in certain situations, 
amendments that leave some claims with the exact same language as in the original 
published patent application can still arguably be considered narrowing amendments.  
This may sound counterintuitive, but the Federal Circuit in an en banc opinion stated that 




¶31  Judge Newman disagreed with this interpretation in her dissent, stating that 
“[r]ewriting of a claim in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 can never be a narrowing 
amendment, because, by statute, rewriting a dependent claim in independent form does 
not narrow the claim’s scope.  The Court did not purport to overturn that well-respected 
law.”57  One must also keep in mind that the opinion was in the context of prosecution 
history estoppel, which may later bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the 
limitations contained in the dependent claim.
58
  However, the majority failed to endorse 
Judge Newman’s position or even address it.  Additionally, the majority did specifically 
define such amendments as “narrowing amendments” and, when considered in 
conjunction with the K-TEC and Pandora rulings, the decision could be used to argue 
that narrowing amendments can preclude a finding that the claims are substantially 
identical.  The court’s failure to address this seemingly obvious conundrum is particularly 
odd. 
¶32  The court in Honeywell explained that rewriting a dependent claim in independent 
form could be a narrowing amendment.  It stated that “[a] presumption of surrender 
therefore arises if rewriting the dependent claims into independent form, along with 
canceling the original independent claims, constitutes a narrowing amendment.”59  Thus, 
the court stated that rewriting a dependent claim in independent form could be a 
narrowing amendment (although it was in the context of prosecution history estoppel 
which may later bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the limitations 
contained in the dependent claim).  And the K-TEC and Pandora rulings indicate that 
narrowing amendments can preclude a finding that the claims are substantially identical.  
Combining the reasoning from Honeywell with the K-TEC and Pandora rulings supports 
the argument that rewriting a dependent claim in independent form could preclude a 
finding that the claims are substantially similar because the change could be a narrowing 
amendment.  Based on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Honeywell, one cannot 
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automatically assume that claims in the issued patent are substantially similar to those in 
the published application simply because they are the dependent claims with the exact 
same language rewritten in independent form. 
V. SUGGESTED INTERPRETATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
¶33  This Comment recommends that the Federal Circuit consolidate the reasonable 
interpretations applied by the district courts in the rulings discussed in this Comment.  
Some may argue that there is no need for the Federal Circuit to provide any guidance 
because, as seen above, the district courts that have addressed these issues have so far 
produced reasonable results.  However, very few district courts have addressed § 154(d) 
provisional rights and their rulings are not binding.  If the Federal Circuit does not 
provide binding precedent, there is a risk that other district courts may not be as 
reasonable in their interpretations.  Forum shopping is very common in patent cases and 
in the absence of binding precedent, infringers could find courts willing to take the 
interpretation in a different direction and weaken the protection promised to inventors.  
Such uncertainty about the application of § 154(d) would defeat congressional intent in 
providing protection to inventors and increase litigation costs. 
¶34  For the specific issue raised by Honeywell and the overall interpretation of the 
§ 154(d) requirements, this Comment recommends that the Federal Circuit focus on an 
interpretation that helps achieve Congress’s goal of encouraging inventors to publish 
their applications.  Putting dependent claims into independent form is a very common 
claim amendment.  If the claims are no longer substantially identical after such 
amendments, there would be very few instances where pre-issuance damages will apply 
and provisional rights will not serve the intended purpose of incentivizing inventors to 
publish their applications.  There would be the potential for widespread misuse of the 
patent publication system to produce applicants’ inventions from the published 
applications during the period before the patent issues.  With the long pendency periods 
and existing backlog at the USPTO, inventors could be left without protection for a 
substantial period of time and they may choose to avoid publication so that their 
applications are kept confidential. 
¶35  Therefore, the Federal Circuit should clarify that, for the purpose of determining 
provisional rights, claims that are still substantially identical after amendment are not to 
be considered narrowing amendments in situations where a dependent claim in the 
published application was put into independent form in the issued patent.  Additionally, 
the Federal Circuit should affirm the reasoning from K-TEC and Pandora that not all 
claim amendments preclude a finding that claims are substantially identical, even those 
that are in response to USPTO rejections.  The court should emphasize that each claim 
amendment should be individually evaluated to determine its impact on the scope of the 
claim. 
¶36  With respect to the actual notice requirement, the Federal Circuit should issue an 
opinion that confirms and combines the reasoning from K-TEC, First Years, and Arendi 
to create a rule that will provide more certainty for potential litigants.  Additionally, such 
a move would provide binding precedent for the future and would prevent other district 
courts from expanding or narrowing the impact of § 154(d) according to their whims.  
The Federal Circuit should not only rule out constructive notice, but also establish that 
direct notification action by patentee is not a necessary condition.  The court should 
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establish that it is sufficient if the alleged infringer knew about the patent application 
through other means.  The court should also establish requirements for direct notification 
that are fair to both patentees and potential infringers.  Patentees should not have to 
specifically point out the infringement, but they also should not be able to conceal the 
notification among other documents. 
  
